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CHARLES HENRY BE'I'HE CI'l'Y OF l.JOS ANfor Public Use.-Where
is placed on
in court, the lien
bond attaches to the award and is
from the condemned land.
Domain-Persons Entitled to Compensation-Lienholders.-:B'ailure of
to join a lienholder under a street
bond in a condemnation
instituted
the land subject to the lien left the lien unthe lienholder was not otherwise protected,
e.g., by deposit in court.
!d.-Remedies for Unlawful Taking-Recovery of Possession.
a condemnation proceeding by which a city acquired an easement for street purposes across land on which
a street improvement bond constituted a lien was not effective to perfect the
title as against the lienholder, because
of failure to
him in the condemnation proceeding, the
devotion of the condemned land to public
the lienholder's successor in interest from gainand
disrupting the public use.
!d.-Remedies for Unlawful Taking-Inverse Condemnation.
-\Vhere failure to
a lienholder under a street improvement bond in a condemnation proceeding instituted by the
city for street purposes leaves his lien unimpaired by the
judgment, the doctrine of inverse condemnation entitles him
to compensation for the taking of a part of his interest in the
property.
!d.-Remedies for Unlawful Taking-Inverse Condemnation.
-The claim filing requirements of a city charter cannot apply
to a claim for compensation for a taking by the city by
eminent domain because it is not a municipal affair; it is a
See Ca1.Jur.2d, Eminent Domain, § 385 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Eminent Domain, § 380 et seq.
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Eminent Domain,§§ 7, 374 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Conversion,§ 4; [2] Eminent Domain,
§58; [3] Eminent Domain, § 195; [4, 5, 13, 14] Eminent Domain,
§ 194; [6, 9-11] Municipal Corporations, § 72; [7] Municipal Corporations, § 86; [8] Eminent Domain, § 43(1); [12] Municipal
Corporations, § 453 (3).
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matter of
the state
[6]

[7]

[8]

is self-executing.
[9] Municipal
A
charter cannot

this being a matter of
cent Wharf & ·warehouse
[278 P. 1028], and
v.
of V '.mt ura, 39
732 [104 P.2d 102].)
[11] Id.-Charters-Applicability.-City charter
do not
apply to a conYentional eminent domain
[12] Id.-Claims-Presentment.-Filing a elaim
a
for damages resulting from condemnation of land is not a
prerequisite to recovery of such
[13] Eminent Domain-Remedies for Unlawful Taking-Inverse
Condemnation.-In inverse condemnation the
owner
is forced to prosecute proceedings, for otherwise he is remediless; his action may be to recover the
and for preventiye relief in that connection, and rs not a demand for
money within charter provisions
claims
against the city.
(14] !d.-Remedies for Unlawful
Condemnation.
The right of a lienholder under a street improvement bond,
who was not joined in a condemnation proceeding instituted
by the city for street purposes, to comp(·nsation, under the doctrine of inverse condemnation for the
of a part of his
interest in the property is not affected
fact that he and
his predecessors had notice of the
for which the assessment was levied that resulted in the
lien for the establishment of the street and made no objection.
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and reversed in part.
Action to
title to land and for
Part of
judgment declaring that plaintiff was owner of land subject
to defendant's
easement for street purposes, afiirmed;
part of judgment determining that
was to take nothing by the action, reversed.
Guerin & Guerin and ,John J. Guerin for Appellant.
Roger Arnebergh, City AttornPy, Bourke Jones, Assistant
City Attorney, Peyton H. JVIoorP, .Jr., Chief Deputy City Attorney, and Spencrr h Halverson, Deputy City Attorney, for
Respondent.
CARTEl~, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment declaring
that he is the owner of a certain parcel of land subject to
the defendant city's easement for street purposes. He brought
the action to quiet title to the land and for ejectment. He
claims title by virtue of a city treasurer's deed issued to
his predecessor in interest pursuant to a foreelosure sale
following the default in payment of a street improvement
bond issued under the Improvement Act of 1911 (now Sts.
& Hy. Code, §§ 5000-6794).
The assessment resulting in this bond was recorded on
November 23, 1927. The bond was issued on December 28,
1927, to the Municipal Bond Company. On November 25,
1927, the defendant city commenced a condemnation proceeding under the Street Opening Act of 1903 ( Sts. & Hy. Code,
§§ 4000-4443), in which it acquired an easement for street purposes across a part of the land upon which the improvement
bond constituted a lien. Neither the owner of that lien nor any
holder of the bond was joined as a party to the condemnation
proceeding. Final judgment of condemnation was entered
on July 23, 1931, and the record owner of the portion condemned was awarded and paid the sum of $5,376.20. The
city took possession of the condemned property on January
22, 1932, forthwith devoted it to public use as a part of a
city street, and has continued to devote it to the same use.
Meanwhile, on October 19, 1938, a certificate of treasurer's
sale of the property in question was issued to one Al Schuh.
The certificate was transferred to Betty ·wilson, and on
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issued to her. She
to
1951, and he filed
this action on the following day. No portion of the assessment or bond has been paid.
The plaintiff contends that his title to the property is
not subject to any city easement, bnt that even if the city
has acquired an easement over the property, the doctrine of
inverse condemnation entitles him to compensation for at least
the value of the lien at the time the easement was acquired.
The city claims that the 1927 condemnation proceeding
established an easement over the property valid as against
the plaintiff. It argues that the lien of the improvement
bond was transferred to the award in the condemnation proceeding despite the failure to join the lienholder, and that
the lienholder's remedy was to appear and assert his rights
in the condemnation proceeding or to collect the amount of
the bond from the person who received the award-the then
owner of the fee.
[1] Where a condemnation award is placed on deposit in
court the lien attaches to the award and is removed from
the condemned land. However, where, as here, the award
has been paid to the owner of the fee, the rights of a lienholder
who has not been joined as a party to the condemnation
proceeding have not been clearly defined in this state.
Generally, the statutes regulating eminent domain procedure
make it evident that the lienholder's interest should be protected in some manner. (Thibodo v. United States [9th Cir.],
187 F.2d 249, 255-257; see Code Civ. Proc., § 1244, subd. 2,
§ 1245.3, § 1248, subds. 1, 8, § 1252.) The city did not choose
to protect the lienholder by depositing the award into court
as authorized by section 1252 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
It did not deduct the amount of the lien from the award,
as authorized by subdivision 8 of section 1248 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. The interest of the lienholder in the property was a matter of record. [2] Although the city was
apparently required to make him a party to the condemnation proceeding (see Code Civ. Proc., § 1244, subd. 2; see,
also, Code Civ. Proc., § 1245.3), it did not do so, but under the
1903 act only notice must be given (Sto;;. & Hy. Code, §§ 42094211). From a consideration of all of the factors involved, it
appears that the failure to join the lienholder in the 1927 condemnation proceeding left his lien unimpaired. (In accord, see
Thiboclo v. United States, supra [9th Cir.], 187 F.2d 249;
c~HULLLvu

[47 C.2d
464
[105

from
possession
use-it vests the eity with
Co. v.
of Los Angeles,
; 1-Iossom v. C·ity
Long Beach,
P.2d 787];
v. City of Los
99 [128 P.2d 693].)
The
\; eontention that the doctrine of inverse
c:ondenmatiou entitle,; him to compensation for the taking
of a
of his interest in the property is correct. (Hillside
Water Co.
Los Angeles, supra; 17 Cal.Jur.2d,
Eminent
§ 7, pp. 585-586; 18 Cal.J nr.2d, Eminent
Domain, §
pp. 95-96.) However, defendant contends that
pw.u""""-'" daim for compensation is lost by his failure to
file a claim with the city as required by sections 363 and
876 of the
charter 'l'hose sections require that a written
daim for any money or damages asserted to be due from
the
be filed with the city clerk within six months after
the occuiTence from which the claim arose. No claim of any
kind unless plaintiff's complaint be so considered was ever
filed by plaintiff. It is unnecessary to decide whether the plaintiff's claim arose in 1932 when the property was devoted
to a
use, in 1950 upon the issuance of the treasurer's
or at some time between these two dates. The trial
court found that no claim was filed by the plaintiff or his
ed•ecE~ss,ors in interest, and this action was commenced more
than six months after the treasurer's deed was issued, but
as will be seen, it was not necessary for plaintiff to file a
claim under the charter; the charter provisions have no applieation to claims for compensation under inverse condemnation.
Plaintiff was not required to file a claim with the city
in order to be entitled to compensation for his land taken
under the power of eminent domain. The claim filing reof the Los Angeles Charter (L. A. Charter, §§ 363,
376) cannot
to a claim for compensation when a taking
is by eminent domain because it is not a municipal affair;
it is a matter of statewide concern and may be regulated
onJ;.r by the state Legislature•, such as the statutes of limita-
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tion. Even if
provisions are not
property taken
eminent domain.
It has been held
that where
posed by statute* the method or
ment of the
actions is not a
(Wilkes
393 [112 P.2d
App.2d 242
29 CaL2d 661
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the
for

of time, for filing claims
tortious acts or omissions in connection 1vith such
is likewise exclusively of municipal concern and governed
by its charter. Even if we assume respondent's
her
asserted conclusion does not follow. The
and maintenance of public streets is typically a municipal affair . . .
but liability for defective streets, inclnding the procedure
for enforcing it, is a matter
state concern (Wilkes
v. City, etc., of San Francisco (1941), supra, 44 Cal.App.2d
393, 397 [112 P.2d 759] ; Donglass v. City of Los Angeles
(1935), supra, 5 CaL2d 123, 128
P.2d 353]) . . . . [I]f
the building be a proprietary undertaking the
is liable
for its torts regardless of the
of Act 5619, supra
(Deering's Gen. Laws, 1937, p. 2630; Stats. 1923, p. 675)
and if it be governmental in character liability is imposed
by that act. In either ease the liability for
includ·ing
·is a matter
concern.''
p1·oceduTe j'm· its
(Emphasis added.) In the Wilkes case the eonrt said (p. 395):
"The right to reeoYery does not arise nnd0r charter provisions but under ::;tate law. The state has thr power to prescribe the method of enforcing the claim. If the state fixes
the period as ninety
within which snch a rlaim may
be filed, a municipality, even by e}mrter
may not
ordain that the elaim will not be
nn less filed
within a shorter
charter
to senk damag('S
risco as the rcsnlt of
*Here it is imposed by the Constitution (Cnl.
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of a public
Such right exists only under the state
law. The
may not curtail or abridge such right
by providing that the claim shall be filed within eighty-nine
days or one day. If it had the right to fix a period of sixty
days it like\vise has the power to change that period. The
right to fix the time within which the claim may be filed is
purely a legislative matter. (Dmtglass v. City of Los Angeles,
5 Cal.2d 123
P.2d 353] ; Wicklttnd v. Plymouth E. School
Dist., 37 Cal.App.2d 252 [99 P.2d 314]; Norton v. City of
Pomona, 5 Cal.2d 54 [53 P.2d 952]; Johnson v. City of
Glendale, supm [ 12 Cal. A pp.2d 389 (55 P .2d 580)] ; Thompson v. County
Los
140 Cal.App. 73 [35 P.2d 185] ;
Kahrs v. County of Los Angeles, 28 Cal.App.2d 46 [82 P.2d
29] ; Strath v. City
Santa Rosa, 19 Cal.App.2d 382 [65
P.2d 894]; Spencer v. City of Calipatria, 9 Cal.App.2d
267 [49 P.2d 320]; Young v. County of Ventura, 39 Cal.App.
2d 732 [104 P.2d 102] ; Kline v. San Francisco U. School
Dist., 40 Cal.App.2d 174 [104 P.2d 661]; Kelso v. Boar·d
of Education, 42 Cal.App.2d 415 [109 P.2d 29] .) If the
soundness of the rule that the claim must be filed in accordance with the time limit provided in the statute rather than
in the charter has been recognized by the courts of this
state, as appears above, there can be no doubt that the same
rule holds relative to the place of filing unless some good
reason appears to the contrary." In the Eastlick ease the
court said: "[A] city, by adopting a charter, becomes independent of general lavi·s only as to 'municipal affairs,' and
that in matters of general statewide concern the general law
is paramount . . . that the existence of a municipality's
liability for the dangerous or defective condition of its streets
is a matter of state concern . . . that with regard to snch
a matter local regulations may be enforced only if they are
not in conflict with the general law . . . . However, defendant
contends that its charter provision as to itemization of damages is merely supplementary to the general law-an additional, not a contrary requirement-and therefore is valid.
As authority for this position, defendant cites such cases
as [citations]. But these cases concerned local prohibitory
enactments adopted, in the municipality's exercise of the
police power, in a field where the applieable state law contained language expressly indieating that the Legislature did
not intend its regulations to be exelusive . . . . '"Whether the
legislature ll as undertaken to occupy exclusively a given field
of legislation,' so that a local regulation imposing a higher
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every case upon an
of the statute
and eircumstances upon whic-h it was intended to operate.' ''
(Emphasis added; Eastlick v.
Los Angeles, supra,
29 Cal.2d
665-666.) [6] This is in line with the general
rule that charter provisions eannot control in matters of
statewide concern where the state has
the field.
'' Althoug·h the adoption of loeal rules supplementary to state
law is proper under some circumstances, it is well settled
that local regulation is invalid if it attempts to impose additional requirements in a field which is fully occupied by
statute. ( . . . Eastlick v. City of Los Lingeles, 29 Cal.2d
661, 666 [177 P.2d 558, 170 A.I.1.R. 225].) Determination
of the question whether the Legislature has undertaken to
occupy exclusively a given field of legislation depends upon
an analysis of the statute and a consideration of the facts
and circumstances upon which it was intended to operate.
(Eastlick v. City of Los Angeles, snpra, 29 Cal.2d at p. 666;
Pipoly v. Benson, supra, 20 Cal.2d at pp. 372-375 [125 P.2d
482, 147 A.L.R. 515] ; In 1·e Iverson, 199 Cal. 582, 586-587
[250 P. 681] ; Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal. 636, 642, 643 [192
P. 442, 21 A.L.R. 1172].) Where the Legislature has adopted
statutes governing a partieular subject matter, its intent with
regard to occupying the field to the exclusion of all local
regulation is not to be measured alone by the language used
but by the whole purpose and scope of the legislative scheme.
(Eastlick v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 29 Cal.2d at p. 666 .
. . . ) " (Tolman v. Underhill, 39 Cal.2d 708, 712 [249 P.2d
280].) And: "If, however, there is any conflict between
charter provisions and the compensation sections of the Labor
Code, the latter must prevail. Under power expressly granted
to it by the Constitution, the Legislature has established a
complete system of workmen's compensation which obviously
is a subject of state-wide concern, and it is well settled that
in such matters the general law is paramount. (See Eastlick
v. City of Los Angeles, 29 Cal.2d 661, 665-666, 668 [177
P.2d 558, 170 A.L.R. 225] .) " (Healy v.Incl~tstrial Ace. Com.,
41 Cal.2d 118, 122 [258 P.2d 1] .) [7] The exercise of the
power of eminent domain is a matter of statewide concern,
not a municipal affair, which cannot be abrogated by a
municipality; it must be exercised in accordance with state
law. (Alexander v. Mitchell, 119 Cal.App.2d 816 [260 P.2d
261] ; City & County of San Francisco v. Ross, 44 Cal.2d 52

[47 C.2d
Cal.2d 630

the field
eminent
''Private property shall
use without just comor paid into court for,
. shall be appropriated
a municipal corporation
therefor be
made in money
conrt
the owner . . . proin eminent domain brought
. . . the aforesaid . . . muimmediate possession and use of
any
of way . . .
for a public use whether the
fee thereof or an easement therefor be sought upon first comeminent domain
according to law in a
court of competent
and thereupon giving such
security in the way of money deposited as the court in which
such
are
may direct, and in such amounts
as the court may determine to be reasonably adequate to
secure to the owner of the property sought to be taken immediate payment of
compensation for such taking and
any damage incident thereto, including damages sustained
by reason of an adjudication that there is no necessity for
taking the
as soon as the same can be ascertained
according to law."
added; Cal. Const., art. I,
§ 14.) [8] This
is self-executing. (Rose v. State,
19 Cal.2d 713
. ) The Legislature has provided
a complete and detailed system for exercising the right of
eminent domain and assessing compensation. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§§ 1237-1266.2.)
Here the charter elaims provisions are stringent statutes
of limitations-procedural restrictions. (Farrell v. County
of Placer, 23 Cal.2d 624 [145 P.2d 570, 153 A.L.R. 323];
Norton v.
of Pomona, 5 Cal.2d 54 [53 P.2d 952]; Shea
v. City of San BernarcUno, 7 Cal.2d 688 [62 P.2d 365] ;
Thompson v. County
Los
140 Cal.App. 73 [35
P.2d 185]; Rhoda v. County of Alameda, 134 Cal.App. 726
[26 P.2d 691] ; Rose v. State supm, 19 Cal.2d 713, 725,
referring to Crescent Wharf etc. Co. v. Los Angeles, 207 Cal.
430 [278 P. 1028] .) Such procedural matters are fully covered
by the state statutes such as those on eminent domain (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1237 et seq.) and those on limiting the time
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P.2d
[13] In inverse condemnation the property owner
is forced to
proceedings otherwise he is remediless
(Heimann v. City of Los Angeles, 30 Cal.2d 746 [185 P.2d
597] .) His action may be to recover the property and for
preventive relief in that connection. (Collier v. Merced I rr.
Dist., 213 Cal. 554
P.2d 790].) It is thus not a demand
for money within the charter
It becomes so only
because the
invokes the intervention of its public use
as a defense to preventive relief and makes the property
owner take compensation instead of his property. By wrongfully failing to follow the eminent domain procedure the
city forces the property owner to take the initiative. It is
still an eminent domain proceeding and claims are not necessary in such proceedings.
·while the instant eminent domain proceedings were under
the 1903 Street Opening Act, supra, even if it is assumed that
those provisions in some respects control over the general
provisions on eminent domain in the Code of Civil Procedure,
the fact still remains that there is a complete system of state
law for eminent domain proceedings.
[14] Defendant urges that plaintiff and his predecessors
had notice of the improvement proceedings, for which an
assessment was levied which resulted in the lien, for the establishment of the street and made no objection and is hence
estopped and guilty of laches. \V e fail to see how the notice
of the assessment proceedings affects the situation. Plaintiff
relies upon the lien arising therefrom. There is no change of
position in reliance on the inactivity of plaintiff's predecessors except the establishment and use of the street. This use
excludes the remedy to obtain possession of the land but not
for compensation for the taking (see authorities cited in
the forepart of this opinion).
The judgment insofar as it determines that plaintiff is the
owner of the property subject to the right of way for the
street is affirmed but is reversed insofar as it determines that
plaintiff is to take nothing by the action. Plaintiff shall recover costs.
Gibson, C. ,J., 'rraynor, ,J., Schauer, ,J., and Dooling, J. pro
tem., * concurred.
SHENK, ,J.---I dissent.
In 1927 the city of JJOS Angeles, pursuant to street 1m*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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147 C.2d 852.; :106 P.2d 7891

under tlw
Aet of 1911
Sts.
§§ 5000-6794)
1911, p. 730;
levied an assessment for benefits for street improvements on
real property including Lot 195 'l'ract 6710. Assessments that
were not paid went to bond, including the assessment on
Lot 195 for $207.57, here involved. On December 28, 1927,
the bond was acquired by the Municipal Bond Company.
On November 25, 1927, the city commenced another street
improvement proceeding pursuant to the Street Opening Act
of 1903 ( Stats. 1903, p. 386). This proceeding was authorized
by Ordinance 58294 entitled ''An ordinance ordering the laying out, opening and extending . . . '' of the streets named
in the ordinance. By an order of condemnation pursuant to
that proceeding the city acquired an easement for street purposes across a part of Lot 195 upon which the improvement
bond constituted a lien. The owner of the bond lien was
not made a party to that condemnation proceeding. The
assessment represented by the bond was not paid and the
bond was foreclosed. On October 19, 1938, a certificate of
treasurer's sale was issued to the plaintiff's predecessor in
interest who quitclaimed to the plaintiff on April 12, 1951.
This action to quiet title was commenced the following day.
That the opening, widening and improvement of public
streets within a chartered city is a municipal affair is the
established law of this state, and there are no decisions to
the contrary. Prior to 1896 municipal eharters were subject
to and controlled by general laws. By an amendment of section 6 of article XI of the Constitution in 1896 sneh eharters
continued to be subjeet to and controlled by general laws
"except in municipal affairs." In the ease of Byrne v. Drain
( 1900), 127 CaL 663, this eourt said at page 667 [ 60 P. 433] :
"That the matter of opening the streets of a municipality
is a municipal affair is not disputable under the authorities.
(Sinton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal. [525] 531; People v. Holladay,
93 Cal. 241 [29 P. 54, 27 Am.St.Rep. 186]; Hellman v.
Shoulters, 114 CaL [136] 141 [44 P. 915, 45 P. 1057] .) "
In the ease of City of Los Angeles v. Central Trust Co. of
New York, 173 CaL 323, this court stated at page 327 [159
P. 1169]: "The opening, laying out, and improvement of
streets within a city, and the regulation of the manner of
their use are matters of much greater concern to its inhabitants
than to the people of the state at large, and they are clearly
municipal affairs, the control of which has always been deemed
within the proper scope of municipal powers. [Citations.]"

[47 C.2d

Act
lU

was sueh a street improvement
a muni(;ipal affair. The subunder the Street Opening Aet of 1903
for the improvement of a city street
and
likewise
a municipal affair. If the
holder of the bond lien had been made a party to the latter
the amount now sought to be recovered by the
·would have been
in due course by assessment
the improvement or by funds otherwise
on lands benefited
under the control of the city.
The matter of
claims against the city for money
or
is likewise a municipal affair and the city by
charter sections 3G3 and 37G has prescribed a reasonable
time within 1vhieh claims must be presented before suit may
be brought thereon. In the case of BancToft v. City of San
Diego, 120 Cal. 432 [52 P. 712], the plaintiff owned property
in the
on street which was damaged by reason
of the
of the street grade. This court held that
was in a sense a taking of the property as conthe Constitution. 'l'he plaintiff failed to present
a claim
to the city within the six months prescribed
the
charter. 'fhe court held that the action
should be dismissed for failure to present the claim within
the
time. In Crescent Wharf &: TV arehouse Co. v.
207 Cal. 430 [278 P. 1028], the Bancroft
case was cited wtih
Among other cases also cited
to support the holding of the Crescent ·wharf case is TV esteTn
Salt Co. v.
San Diego, 181 Cal. 696 [186 P. 345],
where it was held that there is no grneral law on the subject
of the time when such a claim must be presented to the city
and that a
charter so providing is constitutional. Those
eases have never been overruled or criticized and there has
been and is no anthority in this state to the contrary until
the holding of the majority in the present case.
Furthermore, the charter provision is controlling irrespective of whether it concerns a municipal affair if it is not
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but there is no state
as the majority holds,
occupied the field to the exclusion of inverse condemnation
claim filing requirements in municipal charters. In fact, there
is no state legislation vvhatsoever on the subject, and hereafter
there will be no
charter provisions on the subject.
The majority rely on cases in which statutes specify the
time for filing claims, such as cases arising under the Public
Liability Act of 1923, to which Government Code, section
53052, applies. As noted, there is no statute applicable to
claims arising under the circumstances here presented. In
Eastlick v. City of Los Angeles, 29 Cal.2d 661 [177 P.2d 558,
170 A.L.R. 225], a case where the Public Liability Act applied,
the court stated that a municipality may adopt a charter
provision regulating the presentation of claims and the terms
thereof are applicable to a cause of action against the city
where ''there is no general law upon the subject.'' There
is no general law on the subject of the time of filing of inverse
condemnation claims and the provisions of sections 363 and
376 of the charter of the city of Los Angeles are fully applicable to the claim here involved.
I would affirm the judgment.
Spence, J., concurred.
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied March 7,
1957. Dooling, J. pro tem., participated therein in place of
McComb, J. Shenk, J., and Spence, .J., were of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.

47 C.2d-28

